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We have gotten used to a European Union without borders—without internal
borders. The memory of long waiting queues and passport controls at border
crossing points is fading while we enjoy freely moving around between European
nations. For a continent plagued for centuries by bloody wars over territory and
boundaries, this is a remarkable development. The gradual abolition of checks at
internal borders in Europe was an incremental process that started in the 1990s with
the creation of the Schengen area. In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated
the Schengen acquis into the EU framework. And ten years later, in 2007, the Lisbon
Treaty elevated the existence of the area of freedom, security and justice without
internal frontiers to one of the core aims of the Union (Article 3(2) TEU).
As the EU territory has in the absence of internal frontiers become a vast space
allowing for the unimpeded movement of people, the focus of both border
management and the fight against cross-border criminality has progressively shifted
to the geographic periphery of the EU. This is where Frontex enters the stage.
The increasing role of the EU agency in charge of external border control in the
aftermath of the significant migratory increase of 2015 has stirred lively discussions
on the appropriate level of powers and responsibilities conferred to Frontex. As the
agency’s mandate was once more reinforced and expanded at the end of 2019, this
topical symposium sets out to address some of the most pressing questions raised
by the expanding remit of Frontex. This first contribution to the symposium briefly
outlines the genesis, development, and status quo of the agency, while the ensuing
analyses will zoom in on specific politico-legal matters that are at the core of the
current debate.
Frontex and the shift of border control to the
periphery of Europe
For many years, Member States showed little enthusiasm to share their prerogative
of controlling who enters and leaves their territory—considered a fundamental act of
sovereignty—with an EU structure. National governments agreed on common rules
governing external border control (i.e. the Schengen Borders Code), but preferred a
decentralized and informal implementation mode based, for instance, on a network
of national contact points. However, this decentralized approach proved ineffective.
In view of the enlargement to the Eastern neighbourhood in the mid-2000s, national
governments eventually overcame their reluctance and agreed to partly Europeanize
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the management of external borders by creating a permanent EU structure tasked to
coordinate the implementation of the common rules.
In October 2004, Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 established the European
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders—
better known under its French acronym Frontex. The Warsaw-based agency was
set up to complement (not to replace) the efforts of national authorities, primarily by
providing coordination of the implementation of Schengen acquis, in particular the
Schengen Borders Code. According to an intergovernmental institutional blueprint,
Member States thus retain the primary responsibility for checking their section of the
external border.
Two years after Frontex had become operational, its mandate was altered for the
first time. The so-called RABIT Regulation of 2007 added operational tasks to the
agency’s portfolio: It allowed Frontex to temporarily deploy Rapid Border Intervention
Teams (RABIT) to Member States facing an exceptional upsurge in illegal border
crossings. Another enhancement of operational capacities occurred in 2011 when
Frontex was enabled to set up European Border Guard Teams which could take part
in joint operations alongside national contingents.
And the institutional winner of the migratory crisis
is…
In the wake of the migration inflow, the legal framework of Frontex underwent
a complete overhaul. The new legal basis of 2016 significantly expanded the
operational powers of the agency that was renamed into European Border and Coast
Guard Agency (while keeping its Frontex acronym). The rebranding was not merely
a play on words but made apparent a substantial change: Frontex had outgrown its
support role and had incontestably turned into a player in its own right that fulfils a
regulatory, supervisory, and operational role.
In the course of several mandate revisions, each of which conferred more powers
to Frontex, the agency’s original coordination, training, and assistance mandate
has been replaced by a far more comprehensive and operational job description.
While the initial mandate counted only six tasks, the current Regulation lists more
than thirty. Among those more recent functions are a range of executive tasks,
including (joint) return as well as search and rescue operations. What is more, data
analysis and exchange has become a central part of the agency’s remit. As Frontex
is in charge of monitoring migratory flows, assessing risks, signalling potential
new threats, and assessing potential vulnerabilities of the EU’s external border, it
is at the pulse of managing and planning EU border and migration management.
Unsurprisingly, then, Frontex has turned into a key hub of information and expertise,
which in turn makes the agency a valuable reference point when it comes to
fostering integrated border management as stipulated in Article 77 TFEU.
This trend was reinforced by the most recent mandate amendment of 2019 that
again bolstered the competences and expanded the tasks of Frontex despite
persisting sovereignty concerns of Member States. Importantly, the agency’s powers
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related to the organization, coordination, and conduct of return operations of irregular
migrants were strengthened. Furthermore, the latest reform entails a major increase
in the agency’s human resources and financial means: The budget of Frontex is
planned to triple to reach an annual sum of € 1.3 billion (2021–2027) and its standing
corps (including Member State forces) is supposed to rise to a capacity of 10.000
operational staff by 2027, roughly one third of which the agency can recruit itself
whereas the biggest share of its personnel will remain seconded officers.
However, the expansion of Frontex does not stop here. Next to the considerable
growth of the agency’s remit, budget, and staff, we witness a significant geographic
enlargement of the reach of its activities. In the past, this geographic expansion
was based on a patchwork of mostly informal arrangements. However, both post-
migratory crisis mandate revisions strengthened the legal basis for the extension
of the theatre of operations. In addition to exercising executive functions in States
bordering directly on the EU (as foreseen by the 2016 mandate), executive missions
are henceforth also authorized in third countries that do not directly share a border
with a Member State provided there is a status agreement. In the same vein, the
agency can open (temporary) antenna offices in third countries to ensure the
coordination and logistics needed for its operational activities. In other words,
Frontex is no longer confined to operate at the external land and sea borders of the
EU or in the closer neighbourhood, but can extensively project its intelligence and
law enforcement activities into the pre-frontier area. Judging by the current activities
of Frontex, the EU’s pre-border area is immense: It includes the entire Western
Balkan region, stretches to the South Caucasus, comprises big parts of Northern
Africa and even extends to the Sahel region.
A rising star causing many politico-legal
controversies
This expansionist institutional, operational, and geographic trajectory of Frontex
goes, obviously, no longer unnoticed. The considerably increased role of the agency,
in particular as a response to the unprecedented migratory pressure of 2015,
generates discontentment and breeds criticism. Indicative hereof is the growing
number of (quasi-) judicial proceedings involving the agency at the EU level. The
European Ombudsman, for instance, has recently dealt with several complaints
lodged against Frontex: Next to questions of fundamental rights violations (see,
for instance, the own-initiative inquiry on joint return operations), the unsatisfactory
handling of access to information requests constitutes a central theme of grievances
(as this decision illustrates). Transparency has also been a topic for the EU’s
judicature: Only some weeks ago, the General Court delivered a relatively deferential
decision in a case concerning access to documents relating to maritime operations
carried out by the agency in the Central Mediterranean.
There are indeed many political debates and legal controversies about Frontex
and the way in which the agency, together with the Member States, engages in
external border management and control. Without putting into question the voiced
criticism, which mainly circles around too much unchecked power, it is fair to note
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that Frontex continues to act alongside national authorities that retain the primary
responsibility for the control of their external borders and that exercise command and
control. The agency does thus not have the means or mandate to act independently
or without the authorization of the respective Member State. This said, the agency’s
accountability scheme for human rights violations remains a bone of contention,
in particular when Frontex exercises executive functions in third countries or in EU
hotspots and in the context of return operations.
The significant expansion of the agency’s remit during the last years raises a
range of questions, many of which will be addressed by the contributions to this
symposium. Next to the pressing issue of responsibility and liability for potential
human rights violations, the blogposts will deal with the tendency to move from
preventive to more repressive tasks, which in turn relates to the massive expansion
of data collection and analysis by Frontex. The discussion will equally cover the
extra-territorialization of border management in the Western Balkans and the
progressive use of pre-emptive border and migration control in Africa with a view to
establishing a ‘buffer zone’ to migration from the Global South.
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